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[Author's Note: This unpublished opinion was supposedly found among the pa-
pers of the late justice Antonin Scalia. I cannot say with authority that the supposition
is true. Whatever its source, the opinion is plainly a draft. The argument contains cer-
tain doctrinal inconsistencies, and the prose does not entirely possess the stylishness for
which the lateJustice was known. Probably additionalflourishes were to be added lat-
er. In addition, although there are references to the majority's argument, there is no
Supreme Court opinion that matches up with the dissent's criticism. It is not clear
whether the draft was even connected to any particular case-or, as I say, whether it is
authentic at all. From internal evidence, the dissent appears to assume that the peti-
tioners are challenging certain religious accommodations, that the government re-
spondents are defending them, and that the intervenors argue that the accommodations
do not go far enough. But I am only guessing. I am grateful for the research assistance
of Sam Adkisson. Copyright 2017 by Stephen L. Carter.]
JUSTICE SCALIA, DISSENTING.
The Court today continues its recidess assault on the principle of religious
freedom enshrined in the First Amendment. Because I believe that the Consti-
tution contains no more important clause, and because I consider every en-
croachment on religious liberty an encroachment on democracy itself, I dissent.
(1)
Our jurisprudence on the religion clauses of the First Amendment is fa-
mously opaque. But instead of clarifying the law, the Court today makes itself
the obfuscator of last resort.' Without ever offering a serious argument, the
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majority today holds unconstitutional a set of seemingly reasonable accommo-
dations of religion that appear in the laws of a number of states. True, the ac-
commodations before us are controversial, and they even provoke in some cor-
ners considerable ire, but neither of these concerns is of the mildest constitu-
constitutional moment. Appointment to the Supreme Court of the United
States is not the same as entrance in a popularity contest. No sane citizen
would want things any other way.2
Today's decision is but another in a long line of cases in which this Court
fundamentally misunderstands the Establishment Clause. The clause, as I
have argued in the past, was never intended to prevent the Government from
conferring on religious persons and organizations a reasonable set of privileges
not available to the irreligious.4 On the contrary: "Those who wrote the Con-
stitution believed that morality was essential to the well-being of society and
that encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality." McCreary
County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 877 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course the Government is free in most cases to
choose not to grant preferential treatment to religion. The question is whether
a "mandatory choice . . . has been imposed by the United States Constitution."
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only sen-
sible answer is no.
The Government can and does treat religion as special, because the Ameri-
can people can and do treat religion as special. The state may not discriminate
1. [Author's Note: This is the first of several places in the opinion where the writer, without
citation, lifts or paraphrases sentences from Justice Scalia's opinions - in this case, Michigan
v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Others of which I am aware I point out
in bracketed footnotes, like this one. It is likely that there are others that I have missed.]
2. [Author's Note: This sentence appears to be a paraphrase of HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDI-
CIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 74 (loth ed. 1996). It may also
be an oblique criticism of the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which has been widely criticized as implying that appli-
cation of the doctrine of stare decisis is more important when an issue is divisive. For a par-
ticularly trenchant example, see Larry Alexander, Did Casey Strike Out?, in PRECEDENT IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 47 (Christopher J. Peters, ed. 2013).]
3. As a preliminary matter, I would dismiss the Petitioners' claim for lack of standing. I adhere
to my view that Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), should be overruled. That one is a tax-
payer does not prove sufficient injury to challenge a particular government expenditure on
constitutional grounds. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587, 618
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
4. I do not go so far as to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment does not even incorporate
the Establishment Clause against the States, although that reading of the text and history is
an entirely plausible one. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION 246-49 (1998).
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among religions, and a favor available to one must be made available to all.'
Accommodations of the sort at issue today may be said to encourage religion in
the sense that they reduce the cost to the believer of believing. But a state can
make a rational judgment that it is better off with a larger rather than a smaller
number of religious believers, as long as it manifests an indifference to which
religion they believe.
The majority in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not quite be-
come yet another "ad hoc nullification machine," Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part), but that is the worrisome direction in which we
may be moving. The Court has come to view with suspicion even the most
moderate legislative effort to balance the desires of millions to live according to
what they think God commands with the growing intrusiveness of the admin-
istrative state. Neither the text nor the history of the Establishment Clause
supports such an approach. Certainly the Founders encouraged religious belief,
believing it essential to the proper functioning of democracy.6 Not even those
among the Founding Generation who demanded anti-establishment language
in the federal Constitution doubted the authority of the state to support and
encourage religion generally.' The accommodations at issue here do little more.
"Nothing stands behind the Court's assertion that governmental affirmation of
the society's belief in God is unconstitutional except the Court's own say-so,
citing as support only the unsubstantiated say-so of earlier Courts going back
no farther than the mid-20th century." McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,
supra, at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Beyond that brief summary of the essence of my position, I will not swell
the United States Reports with repetition of what I have said before.' I should
note, however, that I am perplexed by the constant blather to the effect that
such a position would disadvantage minority religions. Oddly, no one says just
how. What surely hurts minority religions more is a callous neutrality that
leaves them to the political process to protect ways of life that may be under
5. See JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 114-117 (1995).
6. See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundation-
al Challenge to First-Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 837, 896-918 (1995).
7. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 101-07 (2002). [Author's Note:
The text may represent an overstatement of Hamburger's thesis.]
8. [Author's Note: Cf Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).]
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threat.' Consider the case before us. Stripped of the frills, we are presented
with
[Author's Note: Here there is a gap. Presumably Justice Scalia (or whoever wrote
these pages) intended to fill in the facts of the case later.]
It is true that the statutory accommodations at issue offer benefits to the re-
ligious that others do not receive. The majority warns that such accommoda-
tions must be viewed with skepticism because they grant an illegitimate prefer-
ence to religion. Ante, at __. Alas, the Court has never offered anything but its
own ipse dixit in support of the proposition that the government cannot prefer
religion over non-religion. The parade of impressively scary adjectives with
which the majority describes imagined dangers of the contrary rule, ante at _,
adds nothing to the argument. This should be unsurprising, given that the
contrary rule is in fact the right one: "there is nothing unconstitutional in a
State's favoring religion generally." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005)
(Scalia, J., concurring). The accommodations at issue here are fully within the
power of the Government. They pose no threat to any value protected by the
Establishment Clause. 0
9. [Author's Note: That minority religions are better off if the state is allowed to prefer reli-
gion to non-religion is clearly implied in Justice Scalia's argument, but he does not usually
articulate it so directly. For a defense of the implication, see Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia's
Decalogue Dissent down from the Mountain, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 287. One can readily see the
point. If a state adopts, say, a school voucher program that includes religious schools, then
all religions that operate schools benefit. Despite fiery assaults launched against it, Scalia's
argument that the state can prefer religion over non-religion seems perfectly plausible. I
would rather rest the principle on a different foundation than he does, to wit, the value to
democracy of religious dissent and the need to nurture the nomic communities where dis-
sensus develops. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION
ON LAw, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998).]
[Having said this, I am constrained to add that there are very deep problems with Jus-
tice Scalia's further suggestion in his McCreary dissent that in addition to preferring religion
over non-religion the state may also prefer the Judeo-Christian religious tradition over oth-
ers. There is no need to go into detail about the difficulties because they have been well ven-
tilated by others. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice
Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 1oo Nw. U. L. REv.
1097 (20o6); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity
and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275 (2007) .1
10. [Author's Note: It is not the job of a Supreme Court Justice to respond to academic litera-
ture criticizing this vote or that. Nevertheless, we should note that there are problems with
Justice Scalia's deployment of history, particularly in McCreary. To be sure, the same might
be said of the other opinions in the case. See Steven K. Green, "Bad History": The Lure of His-
tory in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1717 (20o6). But that is
hardly an excuse. I do not object as others do to Scalia's particular brand of textualism, in
which we ask not what the drafters of the Constitution and its amendments might have said
but what the words would have meant to others at the time that the provisions were written.
The method, however, places enormous pressure upon the interpreter to get the history
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(II)
Merely establishing that the accommodations at issue are permitted by the
First Amendment does not dispose of the case. Intervenors argue that the ex-
emptions they have been granted are too narrow. The right to free exercise,
they insist, demands more. In effect they contend that the rules should be writ-
ten around them, rather than demanding that they demonstrate their entitle-
ment to the exception in order to receive it. The majority rejects both argu-
ments. According to the Court, ante, at _, accommodation is properly the
work of the political branches - an ironic proposition indeed, given that six Jus-
tices have today voted to strike down precisely the accommodations that the
work of those political branches produced.
(A)
(1)
Before we can decide whether the exemptions at issue are narrower than
what the Constitution commands, we must first determine whether the Consti-
tution commands any exemptions at all. The Court answers, in effect, that ac-
commodations are mandated only in rare circumstances left unspecified. But
when the burden on religious practice is "incidental" and the law in question is
one of "general application," the burdened believer must seek relief from the
regulator. Ante, at _. This, the majority tells us, is the only sensible reading of
the Free Exercise Clause. Otherwise, we are told, the creation of "a prima facie"
right to accommodation would allow challenges on religious freedom grounds
to every conceivable statute or regulation. To illustrate the presumed absurdity
of a broader requirement for accommodations, the Court, ante at _, invents a
religion that objects to driving on the right-hand side of the road." Such tom-
foolery might suffice in the law school classroom, but in a court of law we
should worry only about issues likely to arise.
right. And although Justice Scalia's historical excursions were always interesting, they were
not always persuasive. For criticisms of his historical analysis in fields other than religion,
see, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph ofJustice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L. J. 183 (2005);
Joseph Blocher, The Death Penalty and the Fifth Amendment, iII Nw. L. REv. 1 (2016); Note,
The Eighth Amendment, Proportionality, and the Changing Meaning of "Punishments," 122
HARv.L.RREv. 960 (2009).]
n1. [Author's Note: There seems to be no extant Supreme Court opinion that deploys this par-
ticular example. But see Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAWAND RE-
LIGION: ACRITICALANTHOLOGY 226 (Stephen M. Feldman, ed. 2000).]
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I once reasoned as the majority does now. I joined the Court's opinions in,
among others, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988), holding that there was no violation of Free Exercise when the Forest
Service decided to develop public lands in a way that was "devastating" to a
tribe's religious practices; O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), hold-
ing that reasonable penal practice trumped a Muslim inmate's need to attend a
religious celebration; and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), allowing
the Air Force to punish a Jewish officer for refusing to remove his yarmulke in-
doors. I also authored the Court's opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1989), where we held that the use of peyote in a ritual of the Native
American Church was not entitled to a constitutional exemption from a state's
drug laws. For disappointed religionists, the only source of relief in these cases
was the legislature.
I am not prepared to conclude that all of these cases were wrongly decided.
But we were mistaken in each of them to suggest that the very political branch-
es that had chosen to ignore the religious practices now burdened were the only
constitutionally permissible saviors of those same practices. Yet this has been
our basic approach to Free Exercise claims for three decades. Absent evidence
of patent discrimination by government against a particular religion (see, for
example, Church of Lukumi Bababalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993)), we remand religious minorities to politics. But a freedom of religion
that must await the Government's favorable response to a "Mother, may I?" is
not a freedom of religion at all.12
We should admit our errors. I did indeed once believe the First Amend-
ment right to religious freedom was as restricted as the Court today reaffirms.
"More mature consideration has persuaded me that is wrong." Tome v. United
States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). The trouble with Free Exercise understood as narrowly as the
majority understands it is that the liberty the clause is intended to protect turns
out to depend entirely on the whim of the passing majority. Thus we are pre-
sented with the rare and extraordinary case (I confess that I cannot recall an-
other) in which our critics among the scholarly commentariat were actually
right.1
We are asked in effect to trust government officials to make wise decisions
about what religious behavior to prohibit and what religious behavior to per-
12. [Author's Note: Cf Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 241 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).]
13. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 118
(1993); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REv. 11o9 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW.
L. REV. 449 (2000).
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mit. This is a peculiar way indeed to think about constitutional rights, because
the liberty of the believer turns out to include only so much of his belief as the
relevant bureaucrat can stomach. "Our Nation has preserved freedom of reli-
gion, not through trusting to the good faith of individual agencies of govern-
ment alone, but through the constitutionally mandated vigilant oversight and
checking authority of the judiciary." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 523
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
(2)
Consider what it means to "exercise" one's religion freely. It is conceded on
all sides that the word includes the ability to worship, preach, and study with-
out the interference of the state. 14 But is that all that the word encompasses? To
the scholar, religion may be defined as referring properly to practices that give
meaning to life and flow from convictions of a particular kind." That is also
how we should understand the word religion in the First Amendment. In in-
terpreting the Constitution we should look for "the original meaning of the
text, not what the original draftsmen intended.1 6 We should uncover this orig-
inal meaning by learning how the words were used at the time of adoption."
Undertaking that exercise here, we learn that the Founding Generation seems
to have understood religion in much the same way. In the late eighteenth cen-
14. [Author's Note: Actually it is not conceded on all sides. A small but growing literature
would, in the name of equality, regulate religious speech even within the confines of the
house of worship. I will say only that such arguments in favor of the total state, although
sometimes impressive, remain arguments in favor of the total state.]
15. See Jim Stone, A Theory of Religion Revised, 37 RELIGIOUs STUD. 177 (2001).
iS. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 38 (1998).
[Author's Note: Perhaps the most generous and thoughtful critique of Justice Scalids ap-
proach is William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH L. REv. 1301 (1998).]
17. [Author's Note: I do not find Justice Scalids interpretive method as disagreeable as many
legal scholars do. I have been arguing for nearly thirty years that constitutional meaning is
properly discovered not in the notes of the deliberations of the drafters but in the political
science of the Founding Era. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflec-
tions on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 371-375
(1990); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 120-126
(1988). I am not quite ready to claim that we can declare a meaning semper, ubique, et ab om-
nibus, and my method is not the same as Scalids. My argument is that strictly cabining in-
terpretation of the Constitution's structural provisions this way will help legitimate the occa-
sional legerdemain in judicial application of the clauses protecting rights. Put otherwise, a
court need not apply the same hermeneutic to every passage it is called upon to interpret. See
Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary De-
fense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L. J. 821 (1985). With this note out of the way, I prom-
ise to refer to my own work as little as possible, consistent with the need for clarity.]
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tury, when the regulatory state was many orders of magnitude smaller, it was
taken for granted that members of every sect could live their lives largely as
they pleased. Many of the state constitutions of the eighteenth century, some
by their language and some by interpretation, implicitly recognized this notion
by protecting not only religious opinion and speech but religious practices."
This approach in turn fostered a religious plurality valued by the Founders and
demanded by dissenters."9
This is the vision that should guide our analysis. If exercising religion does
not include the freedom of the believer to live and act in the world according to
his understanding of what God commands, then the constitutional guarantee is
a mere grimbly-gunk.2 0 Perhaps this simple truth helps explain why in Bob
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), numerous religious organ-
izations passionately opposed to the university's ban on interracial dating nev-
ertheless filed amicus briefs on the school's behalf, arguing that receipt of gov-
ernment benefits should not turn on whether the government approved of how
those in a particular religious community lived.2 1 Their concern was that if Bob
Jones University could be punished for engaging in religious practice that the
government disliked, their own practices, under a different government, might
be next. The amici were unanimous in the view that religious belief itself en-
tails living in a particular way. Believers have duties.22 For that reason, belief
and action are not as neatly disentangled as our cases pretend.
18. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1455-66 (1990). [Author's Note: It is unusual for Justice Scal-
ia, as here and in the following note, to rely for his history principally on secondary works
authored by others. Because this was a draft, it might have been his intention to fill in more
historical detail later. And, as I have cautioned, it is also possible that the fragment was not
actually created by Justice Scalia.]
ig. See Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundation of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REv.
9 (2004).
20. [Author's Note: A doll or talisman used to ward off fear. As far as I have been able to deter-
mine, this term originated in an episode of The Walking Dead broadcast in February of 2017.
Given that Justice Scalia died in February of 2016, the presence of this word in the fragment
is strong evidence that he is not the writer - unless, of course, the word either has a different
origin I have not been able to track down or was invented by the Justice in a remarkable co-
incidence.]
21. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HAliv. L. REv. 4, 26-30 (1983).
22. The point is put nicely by H. Richard Niebuhr: "Instead of asking whether we are right
people or wrong people we shall simply inquire what duty we have to preform in view of
what we have done amiss and in view of what God is doing." H. Richard Niebuhr, The
Church and a World Again at War, in THE PARADOX OF CHURCH AND WORLD: SELECTED
WRITINGS OF H. RICHARD NIEBUHR 305, 343 (Jon Diefenthaler, ed. 2015).
1619
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A professor at Yale Law School - not known to be a hotbed of conservative
judicial thought - offers the following analogy:
Suppose you believe that the ice on your local pond is thinner than it
looks. Very likely you will decide not to skate today. If you happen to be
a humanitarian sort, you will warn others as well. You might even con-
tact the local authorities and demand that they put up a sign forbidding
anyone from going out there until the condition of the ice improves.
Each of these actions would be entirely natural, and, in many circum-
stances, predictable.2 3
The analogy, borrowed from the philosopher Gilbert Ryle,24 is imperfect,
and, like so much academic writing, considerably overdrawn. But it will do for
present purposes. For one sees in the example that, given the skater's inner
convictions, it would be immoral to take no action.2 5
The point is that belief and action are deeply intertwined. It is not merely
that our beliefs provide motivations for our actions; it is that the ability to act
on our beliefs helps sustain them. Consider the realm not of religion but of pol-
itics. It is fine to believe in your candidate but it is finer to be able to act in ac-
cordance with your belief: to campaign, to seek to persuade others, ultimately
to vote. If we believe a food is good for us we act rationally when we consume
more; if we believe the opposite we act rationally when we consume less. Reli-
gious believers see their belief in much the same way.
Freedom of religion recognizes the fundamental historical truth that hu-
man beings all through history have believed in a God whose commands are
both prior to and superior to the commands of the state.26 This truth holds for
nearly every culture of which we have evidence.2 7 That many influential people
today consider the notion of God to be so much bosh does not alter the facts.
23. Stephen L. Carter, The Challenge of Belief, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (2014).
24. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 134-35 (1949).
25. [Author's Note: One wonders what the writer would say about the recent literature on the
interplay between moral judgment and reputation. See, e.g., David S. Oderberg, The Morality
of Reputation and the Judgment of Others, 1 J. PRACTICAL ETHICS 3 (2014).1
26. For a lucid explanation and defense of the conceptual priority of the sovereignty of God over
the sovereignty of Government, see JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND
SELF (2008).
27. See ROBERT N. BELLAH, RELIGION IN HUMAN EVOLUTION: FROM THE PALEOLITHIC TO THE
AxIAL AGE (2011). Accepting this truth does not require us to go so far as to say that protec-
tion of religious liberty as a general proposition "only makes entire sense as a social and con-
stitutional arrangement on the supposition that God exists (or very likely exists) . . . " Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
1159, 1160 (2013). For a similar argument, see Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Reli-
gion Matters: A Tribute to justice Brennan, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1059 (1999).
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To the believer, following God's dictate is not a choice but a duty.28 In Lyng, for
example, we dealt with a group of tribes for whom belief and action were tight-
ly integrated. We tend to think of religion as involving creeds and doctrines.
Thus it is easy to say that the religion is sufficiently protected as long as it can
teach and preach. But the tribes in Lyng handed down their traditions through
ceremonies that were connected to specific places. "Rituals are performed in
prescribed locations not merely as a matter of traditional orthodoxy, but be-
cause land, like all other living things, is unique, and specific sites possess
different spiritual properties and significance. Within this belief system, there-
fore, land is not fungible. . . ." Lyng, supra, at 461 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The tribes involved in Lyng are only the most obvious example. The reli-
gious believer, in order to be a religious believer, requires a certain scope of
freedom of action.29 Practice and belief are mutually reinforcing -or, as the Bi-
ble puts it, faith without works is dead.o Each time the state strips away the
ability of the believer to act in some particular sphere according to his vision of
God's will, the underlying belief is itself necessarily undermined. Moreover, we
put the believer to the unappetizing choice between God and Caesar. Of course
there will be times when forcing the choice upon the believer is necessary; but
if that choice becomes the ordinary consequence of all legislation and regula-
tion, the result can hardly be called neutral." That is why, in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014), we pointed out that to refuse respondents an
exemption from a law of general application "would effectively exclude these
people from full participation in the economic life of the Nation."
(3)
Burwell, of course, interpreted not the First Amendment as such but rather
the Congress's effort to enact free exercise protections in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, or RFRA.32 RFRA was adopted in 1993 in the hope of altering
28. [Author's Note: This line seems to be paraphrased, without attribution, from Michael W.
McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L. J. 770 (2013).1
29. The same is true mutatis mutandis when the "believer" in question is an institution rather
than an individual. See Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty
and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009).
30. [Author's Note: James 2:20.]
31. Much that we call neutrality might better be called the elevation of a particular secular
worldview above the religious worldview -a position anything but neutral. See Steven D.
Smith, The Plight of the Secular Paradigm, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409 (2013).
32. In City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we limited the scope of RFRA, holding that
Congress could not, in the guise of enforcing constitutional rights, empower federal courts
to strike down what this Court had previously upheld. I no longer adhere to the narrow
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the course of Free Exercise jurisprudence. The passage of time and the explo-
sion of regulation make it apparent that the Congress that passed RFRA might
have been wiser than we. We should perhaps spend more time than we do pay-
ing attention to the constitutional opinions of our coordinate branches, not be-
cause they bind us but because they might hit upon arguments we have missed.
I am not suggesting that we cede our proper constitutional role. Our emphatic
province and duty to say what the law is will remain untouched. Nevertheless,
as I pointed out when I was somewhat a younger man, nothing in the Consti-
tution requires the Congress to agree with this Court on the constitutionality of
any particular piece of legislation. A legislator, bound by oath, must in good
conscience vote against what he deems unconstitutional, notwithstanding how
many cases teach otherwise. And the same proposition applies when the disa-
greement goes in the other direction-when the opinions of this Court suggest
that a measure may be unconstitutional, but the legislator is persuaded it is
not." Most of the time these disagreements will amount to no more than the
fool's gold of political posturing that we can safely ignore, but now and then
this endlessly renewed stream of ideas might include valuable nuggets of prac-
tical experience from which we can learn.34
(B)
The majority, ante at _, insists that its approach will nevertheless grant the
occasional religious believer relief from a statute of general application, and
points with evident pride to our unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
view of the history of exemptions contained in my concurring opinion. Nevertheless, I see
no reason to disturb the larger outcome in that case. [Author's Note: Justice Scalia's de-
ployment of history in Boerne has been subjected to withering criticism. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience? A Critique of Jus-
tice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 819
(1998). Nor has the majority's historical argument been spared. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The
Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C.L. REV. 783 (2002). In
addition, one wonders whether, should the Court broaden the protection of Free Exercise,
RFRA would magically become constitutional again.]
33. Oversight on Private Schools: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, & Vocational
Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 9 7 th Cong. 47 (1981) (statement of Antonin Scalia,
Professor, Stanford Law School).
34. [Author's Note: Presumably the writer has in mind the metaphor of the "endlessly renewed
conversation" between the Supreme Court and the public introduced by Alexander M. Bick-
el. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975). I am surprised that
Justice Scalia would reference a conversational model of constitutional decision making,
even a model as thoughtful and persuasive as Bickel's. But, as I mentioned, it may well be
that the fragment is not Scalia's work.]
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565 U.S. 171 (2012). But if the best we can do when challenged to prove that we
protect Free Exercise is to trumpet as bold and courageous our ruling that reli-
gious groups are free to choose their own clergy without government interfer-
ence, we must have few accomplishments indeed."
True, the majority propounds a test of sorts to distinguish the case before
us from Hosanna-Tabor, but like most of our Free Exercise jurisprudence, the
test is essentially invented from thin air. It bears no relation to either the words
of the constitutional text or the meaning those words would have had when
they were written. Alas, there is nothing new about this Court's manufacturing
of principles as needed, but further furtive feeble finagling will not save a doc-
trine that has become incoherent. What goes by the name of neutrality nowa-
days is as neutral as a political convention. The doctrine takes sides, and reli-
gion is the loser.3 6 The modern administrative state has become our altar to
Molech, demanding constant sacrifice." And its bureaucrats and supporters,
like high priests everywhere, command the sacrifice only of others.
When the scope of the state was smaller, the religious could go about their
business with little worry that they might run into a rule limiting their ability
to live in accordance with their judgment about God's will. But with each pass-
ing year the space in which the faithful are free to follow their traditions grows
a little smaller. So intrusive has regulation become that it is impossible to pro-
tect religious liberty without carving out a constitutional sphere the state can-
not enter. Otherwise the effort of the individual or community to live as God
intends will be walled up by an endless parade of bureaucrats muttering "Yes,
but" and pushing the religious back a bit more, a bit more, a bit more. Each re-
striction seems minor in itself but in sum they are overwhelming. In the end
freedom itself will suffer the death by a thousand qualifications.3
3s. It has been argued that Hosanna-Tabor merely revives an older tradition of cases in which
this Court has declined to interfere in matters internal to the organization of a religion. See
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWis & CLARK L. REv. 1265 (2017). If so, the majori-
ty's choice to trot out the decision as an example of our concern for Free Exercise rights is
more embarrassing still.
36. The contested ground includes the definition of religion, which the secular tends to describe
in ways that are useful to the secularist. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on Secularism, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (2010). In the instant case nothing turns on the definition, so we
can pass further discussion of the point.
37. [Author's Note: Possibly this metaphor is inspired by the legal scholar Moshe Halbertal. See
MOSHE HALBERTAL, ON SACRIFICE 105 (2012). But there are other plausible sources as well.]
38. [Author's Note: The reference is to the philosopher Antony Flew's often-quoted (and just as
often misquoted) but seldom-read article Theology and Falsification: "A fine brash hypothesis
may thus be killed by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications." Anthony Flew, Theolo-
gy and Falsification, in REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS IN SOME BASIC PROBLEMS OF
PHILOSOPHY 48, 48 (Joel Feinbeg ed., 1968).]
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I can no longer support the proposition that the liberty to exercise one's re-
ligion can be constrained by the vicissitudes of ever-changing regulatory policy.
Consider the believer's point of view. One follows God in the way that one has
always followed God, in the way that one's ancestors have for hundreds or
thousands of years, then is suddenly told by the state that what has gone before
is no longer to be permitted for no better reason than that some powerful con-
stituency has persuaded the legislature or an administrative agency to bar the
conduct in question. The majority holds that absent extraordinary circum-
stance, the believer loses. But it is a peculiar constitutional freedom that can be
waved away upon partisan whim. If indeed the Government's bureaucrats are
deserving of such deference, we might as well just say that they are character-
ized by maximal excellence and be done with it."
But they are not. We owe the other branches deference and respect. We do
not owe them fealty. The majority offers no workable standard for determining
the narrow class of cases where the believer might prevail. Reason finds no ref-
uge in this jurisprudence of confusion.4 0 It is true that legislatures have often
been more sensitive than courts to the rights of the religious.41 The current era,
however, does not seem to be one in which the trend is likely to continue. In
any case, if legislative bodies are protecting rights that we are ignoring, that
should be cause not for celebration but for widespread juridical embarrass-
ment.
We should tear down the edifice of Free Exercise law built over the past
several decades and begin anew. The message of today's result is that the work
will not be done swiftly. It appears that the mansion must be disassembled
doorjamb by doorjamb, and perhaps never entirely brought down, no matter
how wrongly constructed it might be.42
(B)
Even in a more expansive version of free exercise, the religious believer
cannot always prevail. Intervenors and numerous amici urge the Court to
39. [Author's Note: Evidently a whimsical reference to the theologian Alvin Plantinga's ontolog-
ical proof of the existence of God. See ALVIN PLANTINGA, THE NATURE OF NECESSITY (2nd
ed. 1982).]
40. [Author's Note: Cf Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).]
41. In fact, Congress specifically overruled our decisions in Goldman, Lyng, and Smith. See
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 240-46 (2007).
42. [Author's Note: Cf Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).]
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adopt the "compelling state interest" standard of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act as the proper rule of interpretation when free exercise rights clash
with the command of the state. Petitioners answer that the standard would be
too difficult for Government to meet, and that in Madison's multiplicity of
sects4 3 we would swiftly find a multiplicity of demands for exemption. The re-
sult would be anarchy.
Of course every constitutional freedom has limits. Should the Court decide
to change course and rule, as it should, that the Free Exercise Clause mandates
religious exemptions, we will have to determine where the limits of that liberty
lie. But I am skeptical that we will be able to develop a one-size-fits-all ap-
proach. Part of our task is to give clear guidance to the lower courts that must
apply our rulings. In the cases where we cannot explain ourselves with clarity,
there is good reason to think we have decided wrongly. The higgledy-piggledy
state of religion jurisprudence suggests that we have indeed erred. I trust that
should the majority come to the correct view - that the Constitution requires
some nontrivial religious accommodations - we will pronounce a clear stand-
ard. For the nonce, I am content to reserve determining what that standard
should be for the occasion when the Court actually proves willing to reconsider
its free exercise jurisprudence.4 4 I am certain, however, that our current juris-
prudence is mistaken.
I dissent.
[Author's Note: Here the fragment ends. Like me, you have likely spotted any
number of unanswered questions. The last section of the dissent strikes me as particu-
larly frustrating, for we are told that accommodations are sometimes required but we
are not offered a way of determining when. I append afrw observations below.]
The trump card for supporters of neutrality has long been the view that
widespread accommodations will lead to anarchy, although the trump may not
be a trump if we accept, for example, the view of the legal scholar Abner S.
Greene that there is no presumptive duty to obey the law.45
43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
44. [Author's Note: Among the most interesting of the many useful recent efforts to develop a
workable standard is KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN
LAw: RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 228-78 (2015).]
45. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
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If we agree on the idea of prima facie accommodations but accept a more
traditional doctrinal analysis, we would have to determine when the state's in-
terest is so compelling that a religious objection cannot be permitted. Some
would put national security into this cubbyhole, although the draft cases 4 6 then
stand on a shaky footing. Others would argue for the primacy of antidiscrimi-
nation law, as for example in Green v. Connally.4 7 (Here Ronald Dworkin, in his
final book, offers an intriguing partial dissent.4 8 ) But in discussing the question
we tend to put the cart before the horse. We ask "Should the believer be able to
violate such-and-such a law?" when what we should be asking is "What does
the free exercise of religion actually mean?"
In answering this last question, we must be wary of the currently fashiona-
ble liberal authoritarianism that holds that every institution- and, in effect,
every life - should ideally be regulated according to liberal values. My own
support for accommodation of religion is very much tied up with resisting this
notion. I believe in dissent resting on diversity of view. Diversity of view rests
on diversity of the nomic communities in which children and adults alike are
nurtured.4 9 Those spaces are fragile and must be protected, a proposition that
Roger Williams understood when he introduced the metaphor of the wall of
separation to American thought. Accommodation offers a vital means of pro-
tection.
Do I believe religion is different from other human practices, and different
in ways that are constitutionally and democratically relevant? I do, and I have
made the argument many times over the years.o Certainly there are those who
passionately disagree," but I will not reargue the point here. I do fear that the
liberal state of the authoritarians would be an impoverished and intolerant one.
The purposeful diminishment of religion seems to me a mark against the legit-
imacy of the state, which is why I cannot conceive of a situation likely to arise
in which my moral and legal sympathies would be with the government rather
than the Little Sisters of the Poor.
46. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
47. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), ajf'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
48. See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 136 (2013).
49. Stephen L. Carter, Must Liberalism Be Violent? A Reflection on the Work of Stanley Hauerwas,
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201 (2012).
50. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 9; Stephen L. Carter, Dworkin v. Tillich, 29 J. L. & RELIGION 510
(2014); Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
DuKE L. J. 977; Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 7o Years
Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1194 (1997).
51. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What If
Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2013).
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I mention all of that background in order to explain that although I have
considerably more sympathy than the median law professor with Justice Scal-
ia's Establishment Clause jurisprudence (limited, of course, by the notes
above), I am unalterably opposed to the approach that he took to the Free Ex-
ercise Clause for most of his time on the Court. We will never know whether
joining the majority in City of Boerne was simply a matter of statutory interpre-
tation or signaled a new openness to the claim of the religionist whose practice
is burdened by a statute or regulation. Although Justice Scalia's vote no longer
"counts," one hopes fervently that it was the latter.
I am well aware of the criticism that accommodations are wrong because re-
ligions are chosen, and it is thus unfair to place the burdens of that choice on
innocent third parties.52 But although I have not the space here to go into de-
tail, this concern seems to me thrice mistaken. In the first place, at least in or-
thodox versions of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, no religionist imagines
that he or she has chosen God. It is God and not the believer who makes the
choice. I understand that many secularists would sharply disagree but on this
point they are simply wrong. To insist that believers simply pick which religion
to join is to "marginalize their major feature, belonging, which individuals
most often experience as ascribed, not chosen, and understand as fixed, not
changeable.""
Second, if one's priority is not the state but God, then the problem is not
that the believer wishes to place a burden on third parties; it is that third par-
ties, acting collectively, wish to place a burden on the believer. That the believer
is a member of political society is not ipso facto a justification for that burden,
for if that were so then the entire structure of constitutional rights would col-
lapse in the face of a willful majority.
Finally, even assuming that the accommodation does burden innocent third
parties, we might view that burden as a tax that is necessary if the otherwise
overarching state is to make space for religious nurturance. Of course, as I have
noted, the state may choose to weaken rather than nurture nomic communities
that teach meanings different from its own. But this is a highly regressive pro-
ject.
I want to believe that at some level Antonin Scalia understood all of this,
and was moving in a more accommodating direction; in other words, I want to
believe that the Scalia of the fragment was in the offing. And even if he saw the
world quite differently, and even if many of the actual results he reached were
troubling, his opinions on the religion clauses - as on other matters - were col-
52. Peter Jones, Bearing the Consequences ofBelief, 2 J. POL. PHIL. 24 (1994).
53. SLAVICA JAKELI , COLLECTIVISTIC RELIGIONS: RELIGION, CHOICE, AND IDENTITY IN LATE MO-
DERNITY 8 (2010).
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orful, witty, and often very deep. He was smart and thoughtful and was per-
haps more responsible than any other Justice in recent decades for creating the
modern Court. Even the Justices who disagreed with him found themselves
mimicking his method. Close attention to text and history are everywhere. I
probably agreed with him more often than did many of my colleagues, but
"more often" is not necessarily the same as "usually." I always learned from his
opinions, and although I frequently found them maddening, I will miss him all
the same.
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